Analysis of contagion from the constant conditional correlation model with Markov regime switching

Over the last decades, the analysis of the transmissions of international nancial events has become the subject of many academic studies focused on multivariate volatility models volatility. The goal of this study is to evaluate the nancial contagion between stock market returns. The econometric approach employed was originally presented by Pelletier (2006), named Regime Switching Dynamic Correlation (RSDC). This methodology involves the combination of Constant Conditional Correlation Model (CCC) proposed by Bollerslev (1990) with Markov Regime Switching Model suggested by Hamilton and Susmel (1994). A modi cation was made in the original RSDC model, the introduction of the GJR-GARCH model formulated in Glosten, Jagannathan e Runkle (1993), on the equation of the conditional univariate variances to allow asymmetric e ects in volatility be captured. The database was built with the series of daily closing stock market indices in the United States (SP500), United Kingdom (FTSE100), Brazil (IBOVESPA) and South Korea (KOSPI) for the period from 02/01/2003 to 09/20/2012. Throughout the work the methodology was compared with others most widespread in the literature, and the model RSDC with two regimes was de ned as the most appropriate for the selected sample. The set of results provide evidence for the existence of nancial contagion between markets of the four countries considering the de nition of nancial contagion from the World Bank called very restrictive. Such a conclusion should be evaluated carefully considering the wide diversity of de nitions of contagion in the literature.

Incomplete contracts and the problem of social harm

We construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative extemality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. We analyze several kinds of rights, including damages, injunctions, and rights to exclude (arising from covenants or land ownership). There are cases in which allocating any of these basic rights to the first mover-i.e., first-party rights-is dominated by second-party rights, and cases in which the reverse is true. A Coasian result (efficiency regardless of the rights allocation) only holds under a limited set of conditions. As corollaries of a theorem ranking the basic rights regimes, a number of results emerge contradicting conventional wisdom, including the relative inefficiency of concentrated land ownership and the relevance of the generator's identity. We conclude with a mechanism and a new rights regime that each yield the first best in all cases.